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SIMAS v. QUAKER FABRIC CORP.:
ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATUTORY TIN
PARACHUTES
Kristin D. Anger
Abstract: In Simas v. Quaker Fabric Corp., the First Circuit invalidated Massachusetts's
innovative tin parachute statute, designed to assist workers displaced by corporate takeovers,
by finding it preempted by ERISA. After examining the relationship between the tin parachute
and ERISA and the analysis in Simas, this Note argues that preemption was mandated neither
by ERISA itself nor by decisions interpreting its preemptive reach. In light of the state
interest at stake, the Simas decision is unfortunate and suggests the need for a legislative
solution.
The merger mania of the 1980s affected the lives of millions of
workers, consumers, and investors.' Frequent news accounts of mass
layoffs following takeovers led to increasing public concern with the
plight of employees whose companies were the subject of takeovers.2
The absence of a federal response to takeover-related dislocation
prompted numerous states to enact measures intended to curb takeover
activity.'
Massachusetts was no exception. In response to takeovers or
attempted takeovers of several of the state's major corporations,4
Massachusetts legislators in 1989 enacted a package of measures
designed to make Massachusetts companies among the hardest in the
1. Samuel N. Levin, Raiding the Establishment: New Perspectives on Takeover Law, 26 U. Rich.
L. Rev. 507, 510 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, Helping the Casualties of Creative Destruction: Corporate
Takeovers and the Politics of Worker Dislocation, 16 J. Corp. L. 249, 254 (1991) (noting, among
other examples of dislocation, that 10,000 employees of Gulf Oil were laid off after Gulf was
acquired by Chevron).
Labor leaders estimated that takeovers resulted in the loss of more than 500,000 jobs during the
1980s. Hostile Takeovers: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 100th Cong., lst Sess. 262 (1987) (statement of Thomas P. Donahue of the AFL-CIO), cited
in Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 45, 45 (1991).
3. See De Facto Federal Anti-Bidder Stance Exists Through State Laws, IRRC Says, 21 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, 1501 (October 6, 1989) [hereinafter Anti-Bidder Stance]. In 1989, the
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) analyzed more than 150 state laws regulating
corporate takeover activity. Id.
4. From 1988 to June 1989, seven Massachusetts employers were targets of takeovers: The Stop
and Shop Companies, Computervision, The Gillette Company, Polaroid, Barry Wright Corporation,
Prime, and Dunkin' Donuts. Richard Kindleberger (Anthony Flint contributing), A Takeover Bill
Divides Industry, Boston Globe, June 18, 1989, at Al.
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nation to raid.' The most controversial aspect of the package was a
provision requiring an acquiring corporation to pay two weeks of
severance pay for each year of employment to any employee of the target
corporation laid off as a result of the acquisition.6
Legislators intended this provision, known as a tin parachute,7 either
to serve as a strong deterrent to acquirers planning to reduce the target
company's work force in order to reduce costs or help finance the
purchase or, in the event that a takeover occurred, to compensate
dislocated workers. Massachusetts thus landed squarely in the middle of
an ongoing debate about the proper role of states in regulating corporate
takeover activity.8 In Simas v. Quaker Fabric Corporation,9 the First
Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the Massachusetts statute by finding
it preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income and Security
Act (ERISA).'0 This Note will argue that the Simas court's conclusion
was both unnecessary and unwise. Part I discusses Massachusetts's tin
parachute statute against the larger backdrop of state anti-takeover
regulation. Part II examines ERISA's preemptive scope, and Part III
explains the First Circuit's analysis in Simas. Part IV argues that the
First Circuit's decision was not compelled by precedent or policy and
should be criticized for failing to limit the preemptive reach of ERISA
when such a limitation could have avoided negative policy implications.
Finally, Part V examines an alternative judicial approach as well as a
suggested legislative solution.
5. John Glass, State Anti-Raider Laws Tough But Little Tested, Boston Bus. J., Mar. 25, 1991, § 1,
at 5.
6. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § 183 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
7. Tin parachutes have been called the blue collar analog to the lucrative golden parachute
severance packages guaranteed to some executives in the event of a takeover. Stone, supra note 2, at
59.
8. Some commentators argue that any in-state benefits achieved by state anti-takeover statutes
come at the expense of out-of-state constituencies in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
For example, it can be argued that by impeding the acquisition of an in-state corporation, a state is
preventing shareholders in that corporation from realizing the maximum value on their shares. See,
e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & Susan E. Woodward, Corporate Takeovers, the Commerce Clause, and the
Efficient Anonymity of Shareholders, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1092 (1990); Jonathan R. Macey, State
Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. Z-67.
Others argue that states should attempt to minimize the adverse consequences of takeover activity
on workers. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of
the States, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 491, 517. Massachusetts's tin parachute represented a novel approach
to addressing the impact of hostile takeovers. At least two other states, Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania, have enacted similar provisions. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-7-19.2 (1993); 15 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2582 (1993).
9. 6 F.3d 849 (1st Cir. 1993).




I. THE MASSACHUSETTS TIN PARACHUTE STATUTE IN
CONTEXT
Ironically, Simas v. Quaker Fabric Corp. pitted two sources of
statutory assistance for American workers against one another. The
plaintiffs sought benefits pursuant to Massachusetts's tin parachute
statute, created to protect employees harmed by takeovers. The
defendants successfully avoided their tin parachute obligations by
invoking the preemption clause of ERISA, a statute also designed to
protect employees. The determination of how these two statutes relate to
one another is the critical inquiry in Simas.
A. State Regulation of Takeovers
Concern over the consequences of corporate takeovers has prompted a
series of state attempts to regulate takeover activity.'" Early attempts at
regulation subjected tender offers to disclosure requirements and state
administrative review. 2 The United States Supreme Court in Edgar v.
MITE Corp.13 curtailed these first attempts to limit takeovers, however,
by holding that the burden such regulations imposed on interstate
commerce violated the Commerce Clause.
14
States quickly responded to the MITE decision by adopting "second
generation" anti-takeover statutes designed to overcome the Commerce
Clause problems. 5 The Court endorsed the approach of these statutes in
11. Garfield, supra note 2, at 254 n.32, provides a sampling of news sources detailing large
dislocations resulting from takeovers.
12. Donald C. Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A
Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 96,97 (1987).
13. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). The Illinois statute held unconstitutional in this case required a tender
offeror to notify the target corporation and the Secretary of State of an intended offer 20 days prior
to the effective date of the offer. During this period, the target company could communicate with its
shareholders regarding the offer, while the offeror was prohibited from doing so.
14. Three justices also agreed that the takeover law was preempted by the Williams Act, 82 Stat.
454, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f), which amended the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988), by adding certain disclosure requirements. These justices
reasoned that the Williams Act struck a balance between targets and bidders in the takeover contest,
ensuring that neither enjoyed an unfair advantage. Because the statute in MITE tipped the scale in
favor of the target, the objectives of the Williams Act were frustrated and preemption was necessary.
457 U.S. at 634-40.
15. For example, the second generation statutes largely apply only to domestically incorporated
companies and impose substantive requirements less burdensome on interstate commerce. Roberta
Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Virg. L. Rev. 111, 114-17 (1987)
(explaining three different regulatory approaches taken by states following MITE).
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CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,6 upholding Indiana's control
share acquisition act 7 against challenges based on the Commerce and
Supremacy Clauses. The Court's decision reaffirmed the right of states
to promulgate corporation law.
Commentators suggest that the CTS decision encouraged state
legislators to take anti-takeover regulation even further. 8 More than fifty
percent of states, for example, have subsequently adopted measures
allowing corporate directors to consider factors beyond the maximization
of share value when evaluating a takeover offer. 9 Other innovative
approaches specifically address the plight of employees dislocated
following a takeover. 0
B. The Massachusetts Approach to Takeover Regulation
Massachusetts legislators in 1987 created a commission to study the
effects of takeover activity in Massachusetts and to make legislative
recommendations to address perceived problems.2' Legislation reflecting
16. 481 U.S. 69 (1987). There has been extensive commentary on the CTS decision. See, e.g.,
Langevoort, supra note 12; Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: () CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (1) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 Mich.
L. Rev. 1865 (1987).
17. Control share acquisition laws require a majority of shareholders to approve any acquisition of
a controlling share in the target corporation and were a popular form of anti-takeover legislation
following MITE. Romano, supra note 15, at 113-16.
18. See Anti-Bidder Stance, supra note 3.
19. Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1189, 1229 (1991). Such non-
monetary factors may include long- and short-term effects of a takeover on the corporation,
shareholders, employees, and the community. This trend has been encouraged by labor
constituencies within a state.
20. Id. Examples include mandating severance pay in the event of takeover-related plant closings
or layoffs or requiring acquirers to assume the collective bargaining agreements of the target
corporation. Because shareholders of a target frequently gain from a takeover, scholars argue that
states should focus their regulatory efforts on protecting employees and others who experience
losses rather than gains. Indeed, some argue that this may be the only legitimate role for state
regulation of takeovers. See Davis, supra note 8; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case
for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 435,
460 (recommending that this protection be limited to middle managers).
21. The Commission to Review Massachusetts Anti-Takeover Laws made recommendations
designed to deter "financial" takeovers whose social and economic costs outweighed their potential
benefits and to minimize the disruptive consequences of takeovers on stakeholder interests. Brief for
Intervenor-Appellant, Legislative History Addendum at 6, Simas v. Quaker Fabric Corp., 6 F.3d 849
(1st Cir. 1993) (Nos. 93-1098, 93-1103, 93-1104, and 93-1249). Stakeholders may include
employees, communities, consumers, suppliers, creditors, etc.
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the commission's recommendations22 included a novel tin parachute
provision, specifically designed to deter those under-financed or over-
leveraged takeovers that rely on layoffs for financing.'
The tin parachute provision24 provided that employees who were
terminated within twenty-four months of their employer's acquisition
would receive from the acquiring corporation a one-time lump sum
payment of twice their weekly compensation for each year of
22. The legislation also contained several anti-takeover provisions already adopted by a number
of states. See id., Legislative History Addendum at 16-17. For a general overview of how these and
other state anti-takeover statutes function, see Alan E. Garfield, State Competence to Regulate
Corporate Takeovers: Lessons From State Takeover Statutes, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 535, 540-57
(1989).
23. Brief for Intervenor-Appellant, Legislative History Addendum at 17, Simas (Nos. 93-1098,
93-1103, 93-1104, and 93-1249). An example of the type of takeover Massachusetts sought to
discourage is the acquisition of Federated Department Stores by Campeau Corp. The acquisition of
Federated saddled Campeau with a debt load of almost $10 billion. To slash its huge debt, Campeau
terminated approximately 6,500 Federated employees. Carol Hymowitz et al., Wall St. L, Dec. 14,
1988, at A1, cited in Garfield, supra note 2, at 254 n.32.
Depending on the specific approach taken, the presence of a tin parachute could have a significant
deterrent effect on would-be acquirers. A private plan used by The Herman Miller Inc., for example,
would have provided in the event of a hostile takeover the payment of one year's salary for all of its
3300 employees who had been with the company for two to five years. Employees with the
company for more than five years would receive two and a half times their annual compensation.
Alison Leigh Cowan, New Ploy: "Tin Parachutes" N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1987, at D1.
24. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § 183 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994). The statute provides in pertinent
part that:
(b) Any employee of a control transferor whose employment is terminated within twenty-four
calendar months after the transfer of control of his employer is entitled to a one time lump sum
payment from the control transferee equal to the product of twice his weekly compensation
multiplied by each completed year of service...
(c) Any employee of a control transferor whose employment is terminated within the shorter of
the following periods prior to a control transfer. (I) twelve calendar months; or (2) the period of
time between which the control transferee obtained a five percent or greater interest in the
voting securities of the control transferor and consummated a control transfer by obtaining a
fifty percent or greater interest pursuant to a transfer of control as defined herein, is entitled to a
one time lump sum payment form the control transferee equal to the product of twice his weekly
compensation multiplied by each completed year of service...
(d) There shall be no liability for the one time payment to an otherwise eligible employee if:
(I) The employee is covered by an express contract providing for such payment in the event of
termination of employment in excess of that provided by this section;
(2) The employee has been employed by the control transferor for less than three years....
A transfer in control occurs upon the acquisition of 50 percent or more of the voting securities of a
corporation. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § 183(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994). The control transferee
is defined as the entity that assumes control following a transfer, while the control transferor refers to
the entity possessing control prior to the acquisition. Id. Termination of employment is defined as
the involuntary termination of an employee's employment consistent with the eligibility standards
for unemployment benefits. Id.
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employment. For example, an employee who worked for "A"
Corporation for 10 years, earning $600 per week, would be owed
$12,000 by "B" Corporation if "B" acquired "A" and the employee was
terminated within two years. To qualify, an employee would have to
meet eligibility standards for state unemployment benefits25 and could
not have been covered by a severance plan with more generous benefits.
The tin parachute statute combined two of the commission's articulated
goals: to deter speculative financial takeovers dependent on layoffs for
financing and, in the event that a takeover succeeded, to charge the costs
of takeover-related dislocations of stakeholders back to the acquirer.
From a public policy standpoint, given goals similar to those
enumerated by the Massachusetts Commission, tin parachutes seem to be
an effective tool.26 First, they are a highly selective takeover deterrent.
Only when a bidder intends significant layoffs would the tin parachute
have any effect.27 Moreover, tin parachutes may increase the efficiency
of takeover bids by encouraging acquirers to seek targets that
complement existing operations and thereby avoid costs imposed by tin
parachutes. Any advantage an acquirer gains by a "quick fix" of
employee layoffs to boost profits would be reduced by the costs triggered
by a tin parachute.28 Finally, beyond selective deterrence and improved
efficiency, tin parachutes provide needed relief to workers dislocated by
a takeover. Despite the legislation's admirable: aim of assisting
dislocated workers, however, the First Circuit concluded that
Massachusetts's tin parachute infringed on a field expressly reserved for
federal regulation by ERISA.
25. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 151A, § 25 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994). This provision ensures that
employees who quit or are fired for willful misconduct or because of a felony or misdemeanor
conviction will not be eligible for tin parachute benefits.
26. For a discussion of the tin parachute as an anti-takeover measure, see Patrick I Ryan,
Corporate Directors and the "Social Costs" of Takeovers-Reflections on the Tin Parachute, 64
Tul. L. Rev. 3, 49-50 (1989). Cowan, supra note 23, identifies several arguments against their use.
27. Ryan, supra note 26, at 38. For example, a bidder planning few, if any, layoffs would be
liable for minimal tin parachute benefits. In contrast, a bidder intending to implement significant
layoffs may be deterred from the acquisition.
28. Id. at 21. A corollary of this argument is that tin parachutes require the bidder to factor layoff
costs into the bidding process. Id. at 23. Ryan stops short of endorsing the tin parachute device,
instead discussing its attributes and application. He faults the typical parachute in that it does not
protect employees terminated because of friendly takeovers or corporate restructuring in response to
a hostile bid. Id. at 48-49. Ryan also indicates that legislated tin parachutes applicable only to
hostile bids could conflict with the neutrality principles mandated by the Williams Act. Id. at 64-65,
n.222; see also supra note 14. The Massachusetts statute, however, is not limited to hostile
takeovers. Although job loss due to management restructuring could nat trigger benefits (unless a
takeover occurred within the next 12 months), the statute would protect job loss associated with




II. PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS THROUGH ERISA
ERISA is intended to protect employees, though on a much broader
scale than a tin parachute.29 This federal statute, enacted in 1974,
contains numerous protections designed to ensure the integrity of
pension and other employee benefit plans.3" The impetus for ERISA was
increasing national concern over the plight of Americans deprived of
anticipated retirement benefits due to abuse and mismanagement of
pension funds by plan administrators and trustees.3'
A. ERISA 's Preemption of State Law
In addition to ensuring the integrity of employee benefit plans, federal
legislators intended ERISA to foster the growth of such plans.32 To
accomplish this objective, Congress declared that ERISA "shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
29. ERISA was signed into law by President Ford on Labor Day of 1974. It has been noted that
the day was appropriate given that the legislation had been proclaimed to be "the greatest
development in the life of the American worker since the Social Security Act of 1935." 120 Cong.
Rec. 15,742 (1974) reprinted in 3 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, at 4747 (statement of Sen. Javits, a primary sponsor of ERISA).
30. ERISA established reporting and disclosure requirements, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031; standards
relating to vesting and minimum funding, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 and §§ 1081-1086; fiduciary
guidelines, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114; provided for criminal and civil penalties for statutory
violations, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1132; and mandated pension plan insurance to ensure that participants
would receive benefits if an ERISA plan failed, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1453.
Pension plans are heavily regulated by ERISA and are subject to all of the above requirements. By
contrast, ERISA does not regulate the substantive content of employee welfare benefit plans, which
are subject only to reporting and disclosure requirements and to ERISA's fiduciary standards. See
generally David J. Bnimmond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation Under ERISA, 62
Iowa L. Rev. 57 (1976).
31. 120 Cong. Rec. 29,192-93 (1974), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, at 3367 (1976) (statement of Rep. Perkins). An oft-cited
example of the American worker's dilemma prior to ERISA is the shutdown of the Studebaker plant
in 1964, in which 4,000 employees between the ages of 40 and 60 lost 85 percent of their vested
benefits because their retirement plan had insufficient funds. See, e.g., 119 Cong. Rec. 30,011
(1973), reprinted in 1 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
at 214 (1976) (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
32. See William J. Kilberg & Catherine L. Heron, The Preemption of State Law Under ERISA,
1979 Duke L.. 383, 388 (1979) (explaining that this goal is achieved "through the positive
inducement of tax advantage and the negative inducement of avoidance of multitudinous state
laws").
It must be remembered, however, that any other goals of ERISA are secondary to the primary goal
of protecting employee interests. See Rettig v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 155 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
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relate to any employee benefit plan ....- 3 By preventing states from
imposing conflicting or varying regulations, this provision encourages
employers to implement pension and benefit plans by ensuring that
employers need comply with only one set of rules.34
ERISA's legislative history strongly suggests tha': Congress intended
the preemptive reach of the Act to be expansive,35 and the U.S. Supreme
Court has noted that ERISA's preemption clause is conspicuously
broad.36 However, Congress may not have anticipated the full impact
that rigid judicial construction of the preemption provision would have
on employee welfare benefit plans. In fact, legislative history indicates
that legislators recognized that the preemption language was perhaps an
overinclusive starting point and "undoubtedly warrant[ed] further
attention." ERISA even established a task force to study the practical
effects and desirability of federal preemption.3t Furthermore, given that
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). Subsection (b) of § 1144 goes on to exempt a number of state
laws from preemption, including those that regulate insurance, banking, or securities, 29 U.S.C. §
l144(b)(2)(A); generally applicable criminal laws, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4); the Hawaii Prepaid
Health Care Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5) and infra note 44; certain laws relating to multiple
employer welfare plans, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(6); and state qualified domestic relations orders, 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) and infra note 43.
34. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990). The majority of cases require courts
to determine whether a state law relates to an employee welfare benefit plan. Preemption is
appropriate if the law has a connection with or reference to such a plan. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). Preemption occurs even if the state lzw is not designed to affect
such employee benefit plans, the effect is indirect, and even if the law is consistent with ERISA's
substantive provisions. District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580
(1992).
35. See, e.g., 120 Cong. Rec. 29,933 (1974), reprinted in 3 Legislative History of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, at 4745-46 (1976); 120 Cong. Rec. 29,197 (1974),
reprinted in 3 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, at 4670
(1976).
36. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990). It has also been noted that ERISA's preemption
clause, "sweeps as broadly as the English language allows." Leon E. Irish & Harrison J. Cohen,
ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 109, 110
(1985).
37. 120 Cong. Rec. 29,942 (1974) reprinted in 3 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, at 4771 (1976) (statement of Sen. Javits). Javits goes on to indicate
congressional intent to modify the preemption policy if the approach taken had the effect of
precluding essential legislation at the state or federal level. Id. See also William J. Kilberg & Paul
D. Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA
Section 514, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1313, 1314-15 n.5 (1984).
38. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1222 (1988). The task force, designed to "insure a positive synergy
with progressive state legislation," would subsequently recommend that ERISA preempt only state
regulation directly related to employee benefit plans. David Gregnry, The Scope of ERISA
Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 427, 470-73 n.158
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 1785, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 38, 46-48 (1977)).
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the primary focus of Congress in enacting ERISA was the abuse of
private pension plans, and not employee welfare benefit plans, it is
doubtful that Congress intended to broadly preempt state laws regulating
employee welfare benefit plans.39
Courts have expressed frustration with the sheer breadth of ERISA's
preemption language. One court noted that by preempting the authority
of states to regulate even where ERISA does not, the federal statute
creates an "enormous regulatory vacuum" in areas traditionally of vital
state concern.4" Another court expressed similar displeasure with the
clause, stating that the "ERISA quicksand is fast swallowing up
everything that steps in it or near it.... There is a growing phalanx of
courts expressing the fear that ERISA will continue to expand and to
preempt everything in its meandering path."'
Congress and the courts have tried to restrict this broad preemption.
For example, a number of courts have held that state laws allowing ex-
spouses to garnish a pension plan to satisfy a support claim were not
preempted by ERISA.42 Congress codified these decisions by amending
ERISA to exempt from preemption a type of state property settlement
known as a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO).43 On a limited
basis, Congress has amended ERISA to avoid inadvertent preemption of
innovative state legislation and to exempt areas of traditional state
regulation.'
39. Brummond, supra note 30, at 116 (noting that only a fraction of the legislature's time was
devoted to welfare plans in comparison to pension plans); Irish & Cohen, supra note 36, at 147
(arguing that the "paucity" of federal regulation of welfare benefit plans compared to pension plans
supports this position).
40. Gast v. State, 585 P.2d 12,23 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (declining to preempt state civil rights laws
setting pregnancy-related content of benefit plans). See also Gabrielle Lessard, Comment,
Conflicting Demands Meet Conflict of Laws: ERISA Preemption of Wisconsin's Family and Medical
Leave Act, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 809, 822-23 (echoing this point and arguing that policy considerations
support the exemption of this state law from ERISA preemption).
41. Jordan v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 694 F. Supp. 822, 827, 835 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
42. Despite ERISA's broadly worded preemption clause, these courts reasoned that family matters
were an area of strong state interest, that private support agreements had an impact on both state and
federal treasuries, and that ERISA was designed to protect plan beneficiaries as well as employees.
Irish & Cohen, supra note 36, at 130-32.
43. Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1436 (1984) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1988)). A
QDRO is a state judgment, decree, or order, made under state domestic relations law, that creates or
recognizes the right of an alternate payee to a portion of an employee's pension benefits. The order
must relate to the provision of child support, alimony, or marital property rights to a spouse, former
spouse, child, or other dependent of the employee. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1988).
44. For example, in response to a judicial finding that Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act was
preempted by ERISA, Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal 1977), afJ'd, 633
F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981), Congress amended ERISA to address
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B. Triggering ERISA Preemption: Severance Pay as an ERISA Benefit
Plan
ERISA preempts state regulation of any "plan, fund, or program...
established or maintained by an employer . . . for the purpose of
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries" a variety of benefits
including medical benefits or benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death, or unemployment, or vacation benefits.45  This
definition is particularly troublesome with respect to severance plans,
which are not specifically mentioned in the definition and which may not
have the ongoing qualities of other benefit plans. Courts have held,
however, that both funded and unfunded46 severance plans fall within
ERISA's preemptive reach.47
what was deemed by the Senate Finance Committee to be an inadvertent preemption of the Hawaiian
law. Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2611 (1983) (codified at 29 U.S.C- § 1144(b)(5)(A) (1988)).
Gregory, supra note 38, at 433-34; see S. Rep. No. 646, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982).
Even as federal legislators currently debate national health care reform, there are attempts to
amend ERISA's preemption provision to allow states greater latitude in effecting their own health
care reforms. 139 Cong. Rec. E3126, Nov. 24, 1993 (statement of Rep. Wyden that ERISA is
"smothering" many state proposals that would allow the uninsured access to health care).
45. Specifically, the terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" refer to:
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund or
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or
their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, acokent, disability, death or
unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any ben.sfit described in section
302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 [29 USCS §186(c)] (other than pensions
on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988).
Also included in the definition are those plans described in section 302(c) of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA), which provides that money paid by an employer to a trust fund
for "pooled vacation, holiday, severance or similar benefits" also constitutes an employee welfare
benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(6) (1988). A Department of Labor regulation clarifies that the
effect of ERISA's reference to section 302(c) of the LMRA is to inclule within the definition of
"welfare plan" those plans that provide holiday and severance benefits. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(a)(3)
(1992).
46. Unfunded severance benefit plans include those in which funds do not accumulate but are
instead paid out of the employer's general assets.
47. E.g., Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140 (4th Cr. 1985), aff'd, Brooks v.
Burlington Indus., Inc., 477 U.S. 901, and cert. denied, Slack v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 477 U.S.
903 (1986); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1985), affd, Brooks v.
Burlington Indus., Inc., 477 U.S. 901 (1936). These cases both involved employee claims for funds
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To trigger preemption, however, a court must find that a state law
relates to a severance plan and not merely to severance benefits.48 In
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,49 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a
Maine statute mandating that an employer provide severance pay for
eligible employees in the event of a plant closing.50 The employer
argued that any state law relating to an employee benefit covered by
ERISA must be preempted. 1 The Court disagreed, holding that ERISA
preemption is triggered only when state legislation relates to a "plan."52
The Fort Halifax decision established a significant limitation on the
reach of ERISA preemption by requiring evidence of a plan. The Court
reasoned that because the preemption provision uses the word "plan,"
and because the purpose of the provision was to eliminate the threat of
conflicting regulation of such plans, the existence of a plan must be
established. 3
The Court further limited ERISA preemption by crafting a narrow
definition of a plan. The Court found that when an employer did not face
periodic demands for the disbursement of benefits, there was no need for
a plan for coordinating such demands: "To do little more than write a
check hardly constitutes the operation of a benefit plan . . . . The
theoretical possibility of a one-time obligation in the future simply
creates no need for an ongoing administrative program for processing
claims and paying benefits."'54
After Fort Halifax, courts attempting to determine whether severance
benefits constitute an ERISA plan have focused on several factors,
due under the employer's unfunded severance plans. The determination that such plans fell within
ERISA's scope prevented the employees from pursuing the claims under state law.
48. The difficulty is in determining at what point the provision of certain benefits constitutes an
ERISA plan under the statute's vague definition. As one court noted, "[tihe meaning of the term
'plan' [in ERISA] is murky, to say the least. The statutory definition of 'plan' contains the word
'plan,' and, not surprisingly, courts have found the directive that a 'plan' is a kind of 'plan' to be of
limited help." Strzelecki v. Schwarz Paper Co., 824 F. Supp. 821, 825-26 (N.D. I. 1993) (citation
omitted).
49. 482 U.S. 1 (1986).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 7.
52. The Court noted that the words "plan" and "benefit" were used separately throughout ERISA
and nowhere are treated as the equivalent of one another. Id. at 8.
53. Id. at 7-9.
54. Id. at 12.
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including (1) whether or not the benefits are contingent in nature,5 (2)
the degree to which such benefits require an ongDing administrative
scheme to monitor and distribute funds,56 and (3) the degree to which the
disbursement of benefits requires discretionary decision-making by the
employer. 7 The presence of the second and third factors persuaded the
First Circuit to conclude that the Massachusetts's tin parachute statute
created an ERISA plan subject to preemption.
III. THE CASE: SIMAS v QUAKER FABRIC CORP..
In Simas v. Quaker Fabric Corp. of Fall River,58 two long-time
employees,5 9 discharged from their jobs within twenty-four months of the
acquisition of their employer by another corporation," filed claims for
severance pay under Massachusetts's tin parachute statute.6 The district
55. Compare Fontenot v. NL Indus., 953 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding no plan because the
offered golden parachute severance package, which promised substantial cash payment if an
employee was terminated within two years of takeover, was a contingency that might never
materialize) with Akau v. Tel-A-Com Hawaii, Inc., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4647 (D. Haw. 1990)
(distinguishing Fort Halifax contingency with Hawaii statute that triggered severance benefits on
plant closing, relocation, or even partial closing). The Hawaii statute in this case was triggered by a
sale ofjust 1.68 percent of a business, thus demonstrating that the employer would be subject to the
statute, repeatedly, in almost any business transaction. Id.
56. See, e.g., James v. Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, Inc., 992 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1993) (no plan existed
despite varying termination dates and eligibility, and despite necessity 3f making calculations for
social security taxes, health and medical benefits, and 401k plans for each employee). The court
found that the employer assumed no responsibility to pay benefits on a regular basis and that the
simple arithmetical calculations were no more than those found not to be a plan in Fort Halifax. Id.
at 466-67. Compare Wells v. General Motors Corp., 881 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989) (two-year
installment payment option for severed employees did not create plan), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923
(1990) with Akau v. Tel-A-Con Hawaii, Inc., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4647 (D. Haw. 1990) (plan
existed when method of payment called for weekly allowances amounting to difference between
unemployment benefits and employees' average weekly wages prior to termination).
57. See, e.g., Bogue v. Ampex Corp., 976 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that golden
parachute plan denying benefits if employee received "substantially equivalent employment" from
acquiring corporation constituted a plan), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1847 (1993). The court based its
decision on the fact that the employer, on a case-by-case basis, was re'quired to compare a new
employment situation with a pre-acquisition position. Id. at 1323. The court concluded that this
comparison would mandate some administrative scheme to carry out. Id.
58. 6 F.3d 849 (lst Cir. 1993).
59. Plaintiff John Simas had been with company for 18 years and pla'ntiff James Gray had been
employed for 12 years. Gray v. Quaker Fabric Corp. of Fall River, 809 F. Supp. 163, 165 (D. Mass.
1992), affd, Simas v. Quaker Fabric Corp., 6 F.3d 849 (1st Cir. 1993).
60. 6 F.3d at 851. Although the employer alleged that the plaintiffs were terminated because of
their performance, the Department of Employment and Training of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts (DET) determined that their terminations were "not solaly attributable" to willful
misconduct and, therefore, that they were eligible for unemployment benefits. 809 F. Supp. at 165.
61. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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court found that the statute was preempted by ERISA and granted
summary judgment for the defendants.62 Plaintiffs, joined by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, appealed, arguing that the tin
parachute statute did not create a plan.63
The Simas court began by recognizing the resemblance of the
Massachusetts tin parachute to the statute at issue in Fort Halifax.
Nevertheless, two particular features of the Massachusetts statute caused
the court to determine that it went beyond Fort Halifax enough to create
an ERISA plan. First, the court reasoned that, unlike the one-time-only
triggering event in Fort Halifax, benefits due under the Massachusetts
statute could be triggered separately by each employee laid off during a
defined period.' Second, the statute effectively required a terminated
employee to be eligible for unemployment benefits.65 The court found
that this provision, which excluded employees terminated for cause,
would require the employer to go beyond a simple arithmetical
calculation to determine eligibility.66
These features, the court reasoned, would require an "ongoing
administrative mechanism"67 to distribute the state-mandated benefits.
Unlike the one-time calculation needed in Fort Halifax, a Massachusetts
employer would, for each discharged employee, have to determine
whether the discharge occurred during the statute's application period
and, if so, whether the employee was eligible for unemployment benefits
(i.e., had not been terminated "for cause"63 ).
The court concluded that because the period of applicability of the tin
parachute statute was lengthy, and because discretionary, individualized
decisions were necessary, the statute created a plan triggering ERISA
preemption. "[S]o long as Fort Halifax prescribes a definition based on
62. 809 F. Supp. at 168.
63. Plaintiffs argued in the alternative that even if the statute did create a plan, it was not an
employee plan regulated by ERISA. Because the statute placed the tin parachute obligations on the
acquiring entity, or "control transferee," as opposed to the employer, plaintiffs contended that it did
not create an employee plan, which would trigger ERISA preemption. Brief for Intervenor-
Appellant at 14-24, Simas (Nos. 93-1098, 93-1103, 93-1104, and 93-1249). This argument was
rejected by the First Circuit, 6 F.3d at 855, and is beyond the scope of this Note.
64. 6 F.3d at 853-54.
65. The court found this eligibility requirement to constitute a cross-reference to other statutory
requirements, most importantly that the employee not have been discharged for cause. Id. (citing
state criteria for unemployment benefits codified at Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 15 IA, § 25(e)(2) (1994)).
66. 6. F.3d at 853-854.
67. Id. at 853.
68. The court noted that the "for cause" determination, in particular, would be "likely to provoke
controversy" and, therefore, went beyond a clerical decision. Id.
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the extent and complexity of administrative obligations," the court held,
"line drawing of this kind is necessary and close cases will approach the
line from both sides.
69
Because of ERISA's "manifestly broad" preemption provision, the
court found itself unable to weigh the benefits and faults of the tin
parachute statute.7" But the court added a parting shot, seemingly to call
Congress's attention to the two ironies resulting from its decision: first,
that anti-takeover legislation, which had recently survived Commerce
Clause and Williams Act challenges, should perish under ERISA's
preemption clause when the full ramifications of this clause may not
have been appreciated by Congress, and second, that a federal law
expressly designed to protect workers should preempt a state statute
providing benefits to dislocated workers.71 Ultimately, however, the
First Circuit implied that preemption of the Massachusetts statute was the
only conclusion that the court could have reached.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SIMAS DECISION: AN UNWARRANTED
EXPANSION OF ERISA'S PREEMPTIVE SCOPE
Courts and commentators have criticized ERISA's preemptive breadth
when it operates to compel preemption of state laws bearing only a
tangential relationship to ERISA's regulatory field.72 While the ultimate
responsibility for many of the negative effects of E:RJSA's preemption
provision rests with Congress, courts such as the Simas court can and
should be criticized for failing to limit the scope of preemption whenever
possible. The preemption of Massachusetts's tin parachute statute was
compelled neither by judicial precedent nor by the stautory provisions or
policies of ERISA itself.
A. Judicial Precedent Does Not Mandate ERISA 's Preemption of
Massachusetts's Tin Parachute Statute
Courts have long recognized a strong presumption against federal
preemption of state law. Even when federal legislation includes an
express preemption provision, a court should not find that federal law
preempts state law unless that court determines that Congress has made
69. Id. at 854.
70. Id. at 856.
71. Id.




its intent to do so unmistakably clear.73 ERISA's preemption clause does
express a clear intention to preempt a multitude of state laws in pension
and benefit plan related areas. Still, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the clause to require at a minimum the existence of an ERISA plan.74
Respectful of the authority of the states,75 and cognizant of the important
state interest at stake,76 the Supreme Court in Fort Halifax declined to
preempt state law when the statute at issue did not sufficiently implicate
ERISA's concerns to make preemption necessary.77
When, as the Simas court conceded, the facts presented a close
question on the existence of a plan, the court could have relied upon Fort
Halifax to conclude that preemption of the tin parachute was not
warranted. Like the plant closing statute at issue in Fort Halifax, the tin
parachute statute was a response to employee dislocation7t that
implicated ERISA in a limited sense, if at all. Instead of drawing these
comparisons, the Simas court asserted that Fort Halifax actually
supported preemption and proceeded to mechanically compare the
Massachusetts statute to other cases involving severance benefits to
determine whether the state created an ERISA plan.
The cases relied upon by the First Circuit, however, fall far short of
compelling the court to preempt a tin parachute statute. The court relied
heavily on Bogue v. Ampex Corp.,79 in which the Ninth Circuit found a
corporate golden parachute agreement to constitute an ERISA plan. In
that case, severance benefits were due only if the employee did not
receive "substantially equivalent employment" following the acquisition
of the employer, a determination to be made by the employer. The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the employer's need to make a case-by-case
comparative analysis of an employee's pre- and post-takeover
73. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504,522 (1981).
74. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1986).
75. Id. at 19.
76. The Court made reference to statistical data indicating that between 1971 to 1981,
approximately 49,219 jobs in Maine were lost as a result of plant closings. These losses resulted in a
significant burden on public and private social service agencies. Id. at 19 n.13. Of course, the Court
required more than a strong state interest to overcome preemption. But "[i]f a State creates no
prospect of conflict with a federal statute, there is no warrant for disabling it from attempting to
address uniquely local social and economic problems." Id. at 19.
77. Id. at 14-15.
78. See supra note 76.
79. 976 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1847 (1993).
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employment required the kind of discretionary decision-making
indicating the existence of a plan. 0
The Simas court determined that the discretionary decision-making
required of an employer under the Massachusetts statute, due to the
"involuntary termination" condition, created an administrative plan. But
the mere possibility of a discretionary decision under the statute does not
rise to the level of discretion required in Bogue; thus the First Circuit
effectively made an unwarranted expansion of the interpretation of
"discretionary." Unlike the case-by-case appraisal of "substantially
equivalent employment" necessary in Bogue, an appraisal expressly
reserved for the employer, the eligibility determination under the tin
parachute turned on whether the ex-employee cualified for state
unemployment benefits, a determination made by the state's Department
of Employment and Training. Although a limited number of cases may
arise in which an employer must make its own determination," in
virtually all cases any potentially discretionary decision would rest with a
state agency, making the court's reliance on Bogue misplaced.
In the vast majority of cases under the tin parachute statute, an
employer would make only simple eligibility determinations and
mathematical calculations to determine the benefits owed to each
employee. The simple application of such criteria. is insufficient to
render a disbursement procedure for tin parachute benefits discretionary.
In a Second Circuit case, the court held that even under the Bogue
"managerial discretion" approach, simple arithmetical calculations and
clerical determinations are a far cry from what the Ninth Circuit
described as the "ongoing, particularized, administrative, discretionary
analysis" involved in Bogue.82
The duration of the eligibility period for tin parachute benefits, which
extended for twenty-four months following a takeover, was the other
feature of the statute deemed by the First Circuit to support ERISA
preemption. Again, however, the case law does not mandate a finding of
preemption. Certainly, the fact that the statute could be triggered for
twelve months prior to and twenty-four months following a change in
control is distinguishable from the one-time trigger in Fort Halifax. The
Fifth Circuit, however, has held that, no ERISA plan existed despite the
80. Id. at 1323.
81. For example, this could occur where an employee never applies for state unemployment
benefits or where the tin parachute benefits become due before the DET decision is made.





potential for administrative activity extending for five years beyond a
takeover: employees terminated within twenty-four months of a takeover
could qualify for golden parachute benefits that would continue for
thirty-six months. Even in Bogue, the Ninth Circuit found that the
seventeen-month duration of the employer's liability was short.84
Certainly, these decisions could have been read by the First Circuit as
grounds to avoid preempting Massachusetts's tin parachute. The facts of
Simas alone did not compel preemption, and an analysis of ERISA does
not adequately support the court's conclusion that the administrative
obligations imposed by the tin parachute exceeded Fort Halifax, and thus
implicated ERISA.
B. Statutory Provisions and Policy of ERISA Do Not Compel
Preemption of Massachusetts's Tin Parachute Statute
Because Congress failed to adequately define what constitutes an
ERISA plan,85 the Simas court, consistent with the approach of other
courts, attempted to interpret this term in keeping with the purposes and
policies of ERISA. As the Supreme Court recognized in Fort Halifax,
when a state statute fails to implicate the concerns of ERISA's
preemption provision or the regulatory concerns of ERISA itself,
preemption is unnecessary.86 The First Circuit failed to recognize that
Massachusetts's tin parachute has only a minimal relation to ERISA's
objectives.
1. Massachusetts s Tin Parachute Statute Does Not Implicate ERISA s
Regulatory Goals
In enacting ERISA, Congress's primary concern was to prevent the
mismanagement of funds accumulated to finance employee benefits and
the consequent failure to pay employees benefits from accumulated
83. Fontenot v. NL Indus., 953 F.2d 960, 961 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Wells v. General Motors
Corp., 881 F.2d 166, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that no ERISA plan was created when
severance benefits and two-year continuation of benefits was part of voluntary resignation program),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923 (1990).
84. 976 F.2d at 1323. The court found an ERISA plan was required based upon the necessity of a
case-by-case, discretionary eligibility determination.
85. See supra note 48.
86. 482. U.S. 1, 14 (1986).
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funds.87 It is not readily apparent that Congress intended to include
severance benefits in ERISA's regulatory framework,88 but the rationale
employed by courts to include severance plans stems from the nature of
such plans. Because severance pay accumulates each year that an
employee is with an employer, an employer's severance fund may
accumulate into a significant amount of money. Such accrued funds are
subject to the type of mismanagement and abuse that ERISA was
intended to prevent and, therefore, are appropriate for ERISA
regulation.89
However, the judicial justifications for including traditional severance
plans in ERISA's regulatory framework are less applicable to tin
parachute benefits. Tin parachutes do not involve funds that accumulate
during the years employees remain with a company, and would therefore
be vulnerable to mismanagement or misappropriation. Tin parachute
benefits are not accrued by an employer at all;9" they are a cost imposed
upon an acquiring corporation as an acquisition cost when a change in
control results in layoffs. Such benefits are then paid within a short
period to any of the target company's employees terminated within a
brief time span following a change in control. Because tin parachute
funds neither accumulate for a long period nor are held for employees for
a long period, the First Circuit should have recognized that they are not
vulnerable to the mismanagement or fraudulent abuses that make ERISA
regulation of severance plans necessary.
2. Massachusetts 's Tin Parachute Statute Does Not Implicate the
Problem ERISA's Preemption Provision is Designed to Address
ERISA's goal of minimizing conflicting state regulation of benefit
plans is not implicated when the disbursement of benefits requires no
87. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989) (citing California Hosp. Ass'n v.
Henning, 770 F.2d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1985), modified, 783 F.2d 946, cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904
(1986)).
88. ERISA does not specifically mention severance benefits in the definition of an employee
welfare benefit plan. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1503 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Massachusetts
v. Morash, 490 U.S. at 115-16 (distinguishing accumulated severance plans from unfunded vacation
benefits, which were held not to be preempted).
90. If tin parachute benefits do accrue, they are held only by the acquiring corporation and only
from the point immediately following an acquirer's decision to terminate employees until such





ongoing administrative scheme.9' Like the plant closing statute upheld in
Fort Halifax, the tin parachute statute differs dramatically from a
requirement that an employer pay ongoing benefits.92  While a
continuous, formal severance plan must have a mechanism to determine
which employees become eligible, to monitor the availability of funds,
and to comply with reporting requirements, tin parachute benefits are
paid over a short, finite period of time, apply to all employees terminated
within that time,93 and require comparatively minimal effort to disburse.
The nature of such benefits minimizes any possibility of burdensome and
conflicting state regulation.
Additionally, although ERISA's legislative history articulates the goal
of minimizing conflicting state regulation,94 Congress has already
indicated that this aim will not be pursued at all costs. ERISA expressly
exempts from preemption protective state legislation relating to
workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation, and disability
insurance, 95 demonstrating that uniformity will yield to important state
worker protections.96 The congressional approach of reserving employee
"safety net" matters for the states suggests that, in close cases like Simas,
courts should use restraint in preempting state law in these areas.97
91. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1986); Wells v. General Motors Corp.,
881 F.2d 166, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923 (1990).
92. 482 U.S. at 14. The Court distinguished the plant closing benefits from an employer plan
providing death benefits. Although death benefits may be seen as a lump-sum payment, an employer
must foresee the need to make ongoing disbursements to survivors on a periodic basis. Id. at 14 n.9.
Tin parachute benefits, in contrast, may never be necessary and, even if triggered, are paid out during
a limited time.
See also supra part IV.
93. Employees terminated for cause may be excluded. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1988). Like tin parachute benefits, these forms of regulation allow
states to impose on employers a portion of the burden resulting from worker dislocation. Indeed, it
was argued that Maine's plant closing statute was a form of unemployment insurance exempt from
ERISA, Brief for the Employment Law Center and the Plant Closures Project, Fort Halifax Packing
Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1986) (No. 86-341), but the Court decided the case on other grounds.
96. Congress's failure to expressly exempt takeover-related dislocation problems is not surprising
given that much of the takeover activity contributing to such dislocation occurred during the 1980s,
long after the enactment of ERISA.
97. For a related argument, see Lessard, supra note 40, at 844. In a clearer case of preemption
than presented by the Massachusetts statute, the author predicts that ERISA will preempt the
Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act and urges that Congress exempt this "safety net"
legislation from ERISA's preemptive reach.
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C. Policy Implications of the Simas Decision
Preemption of the Massachusetts statute by ERISA will likely prompt
states to react in one of two ways. First, after Simas, state legislators
may eliminate involuntary termination requirements in tin parachute
statutes because they involve administrative determinations that may
cause ERISA preemption. But this is undesirable from a public policy
standpoint because the requirements help to ensure that only those
employees who are terminated through no fault of their own receive
benefits. Elimination of this requirement would result in the
compensation of workers who were not actually injured because they
immediately secured other employment, or who were fired based on their
performance." Excluding these individuals is better policy because it
does not unjustly enrich those who were not the intended beneficiaries of
the statutes and ensures that the acquiring corporation is liable only for
the dislocation it creates. Any slight increase in the acquirer's
administrative burden is outweighed by the benefit from compensating
only those who are involuntarily terminated and who remain
unemployed.
Alternatively, state legislators may include very short eligibility
requirements in tin parachute statutes. The First Circuit reasoned that a
longer eligibility period increases the administrative burden that can
trigger preemption. Using very short eligibility periods, however, will
make it easy for acquirers to evade liability under the tin parachute
statute altogether. For example, if an eligibility period is only one
month, an acquiring corporation could simply delay layoffs for a month.
Additionally, if the eligibility period did not begin just: before a change in
control, an acquirer could make layoffs prior to a change in control a
condition of the acquisition.
Finally, states may refrain altogether from assisting dislocated workers
via the imposition of tin parachute obligations. Such benefits address
important state interests, however, as indicated by the legislative history
of the statute.99 The significance of the state interest addressed by the
statute makes the unnecessary preemption of this law regrettable.
98. For example, if employees knew that they were entitled to benefits even if fired, there may be
a perverse incentive to perform their jobs poorly. See Stone, supra note 2, at 60-61 (explaining this
"shirking" effect if tin parachute eligibility provisions are drafted too broadly).
99. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Similarly, it was evidence that nearly 50,000
workers in Maine lost jobs due to plant closings that prompted Maine to enact the severance statute




V. SEARCHING FOR A MORE REASONED APPROACH TO
DEFINING AN ERISA PLAN
Congress's failure to adequately define the term "plan" in ERISA
presents a challenge for courts attempting to interpret this term for
preemption purposes.' 0 Certainly, courts can look to ERISA policies
and provisions, as well as other judicial interpretations, for assistance.
Any analysis of ERISA's scope, however, must also be guided by
"respect for the separate spheres of governmental authority preserved in
our federalist system." "'
A reasoned approach to interpreting the meaning of an ERISA plan
would involve recognition of the state interest at stake, particularly when
a state's traditional police powers are implicated.' 2 When neither
statute, policy, nor precedent mandates preemption of a state law, respect
for the separate sphere of state authority should compel courts to refrain
from expanding ERISA's scope. The already expansive borders of
ERISA preemption are not well defined; in deciding what constitutes an
ERISA plan, courts should take care not to expand those borders to
unnecessarily preempt vital or innovative state laws."0 3 Of course, a state
law that clearly creates an ERISA plan cannot survive a preemption
challenge no matter how strong the state interest; no balancing of state
and federal interests may be undertaken. Only when there is a question
of whether ERISA is implicated at all would there be an opportunity to
consider alternative state concerns.
Courts should hold that tin parachute statutes address concerns
appropriate for state legislation. First, assisting dislocated workers is an
area traditionally addressed by state regulation."w Second, benefits for
100. See supra note 48.
101. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 19 (1986) (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981)); see also Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 119
(1989).
102. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
103. In the famous words of Justice Brandeis:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
104. See New York Tel. Co. v. State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 539 (1979) (recognizing
Congress's sensitivity to the importance of state's interest in providing unemployment benefits, an
interest "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility") (citation omitted); see also supra note 95
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dislocated workers have a direct impact on state treasuries. An employee
terminated following a takeover may need to resort to government
assistance programs in the absence of tin parachute benefits until new
employment is secured." 5 The minimal administrative calculations
required by the tin parachute statute are minor in comparison to the
burden on state treasuries created by mass layoffs.
However, because ERISA contains such a far-reaching preemption
clause, congressional action may be required to mitigate the effect of
Simas. Congress may pursue several options to prevent preemption of
state legislation similar to Massachusetts's tin parachute statute,
including a wholesale revision of ERISA's preemption clause, a more
concise definition of what constitutes an ERISA "plan," or a specific
exemption from preemption for defined tin parachute statutes.
If ERISA's preemption clause were amended to preempt only state
laws that conflict with ERISA's provisions, courts could ensure that the
federal statute achieved its purpose while finding room for supplemental
state legislation where necessary. 6 Although appealing, this approach
would likely generate great resistance from employers opposed to
increased state regulation of employee benefitst"7 and thus is probably an
unrealistic option.
Second, Congress might amend ERISA to adequately define an
ERISA "plan" for preemption purposes by, for example, specifying
exactly what level, type, and duration of activity constitute a plan. This
would allow states to address local concerns while ensuring that state
and accompanying text (explaining Congress's recognition even within ERISA that unemployment
compensation is more appropriate for state rather than federal oversight).
105. One court recognized with respect to family support obligations that, when balanced against
the heavy burden on govemment resources, the increase in an employer's administrative costs is a
slight consideration. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1979).
106. This was the approach recommended by the task force charged with evaluating ERISA's
preemption ramifications. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
107. This likelihood is demonstrated by the legislative history of the narrow exemption created
for Hawaii's health care law. For example, Irish & Cohen, supra note 36, at 150-52, discuss anti-
labor pressures and point to an earlier draft of that amendment which reqaired the Secretary of Labor
to submit a report within two years to Congress detailing the feasibility of extending the exemption
to similar laws of other states. This requirement, however, was deleted and the final amendment
stated that the exemption "shall not be considered a precedent with respect to extending such
amendment to any other State law." See Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 301(b), 96 Stat. 2605, 2612 (1983).
This language was justified as intending to "help allay the fears of those who might otherwise view
this action as the beginning of a weakening of Federal preemption under ERISA." Irish & Cohen,





regulation would not impair ERISA's aim of minimizing the
administrative burden. Such an approach would reduce the kind of
arbitrary judicial line-drawing undertaken in Simas and similar cases.
Like the option suggested above, however, it could generate vocal
opposition by employers. Another drawback is that legislators might be
forced to engage in the very line-drawing sought to be prevented.
The most viable option is for Congress to amend the ERISA
preemption clause to specifically exempt designated state tin parachute
statutes. Although an exemption could be limited to the Massachusetts
statute, as Congress did for the Hawaii health care law,' a better
approach would be to allow any state to enact such a statute within
specified limitations designed to ensure that the administrative burden on
employers be insignificant.
In drafting such an amendment, Congress should require that tin
parachute benefits be triggered by a change in the control of the
employer.'0 9  This will ensure that a statute is narrowly tailored to
address takeover-related dislocation. In addition, a limit on the duration
of the eligibility period for benefits would ensure that an employer's
obligations would not be ongoing. The time period must not be so short,
however, that it is easily evaded."0 Despite the potential for a slight
increase in administrative burdens, Massachusetts's requirement that a
terminated employee qualify for unemployment benefits serves an
important policy interest"' and should be permitted.
VI. CONCLUSION
The preemptive reach of ERISA is notoriously vast. In light of this,
Congress's failure to adequately define what constitutes an ERISA plan
creates difficulties for courts attempting to determine exactly where to
draw the line beyond which states may not regulate. In cases
approaching that line, if preemption is not clearly mandated by statute or
precedent, courts should refrain from extending ERISA's already
expansive preemption borders when significant state interests are at
108. See supra notes 33 and 44.
109. Using the Massachusetts statute as a guide, a change in control could be defined as a
transaction resulting in the beneficial ownership of 50 percent or more of the employer's voting
securities. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 149, § 183(a) (1994). Requiring a substantial percentage of shares
to be acquired is necessary to avoid the constant triggering of tin parachute benefits. E.g., Akau v.
Tel-A-Com Hawaii, Inc., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4647 (D. Haw. 1990).
110. See supra part IV.
I11. See supra part IV.
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stake. The failure to do so in Simas reversed the traditional presumption
against preemption of state law and foreclosed an innovative attempt to
assist dislocated workers. This unfortunate result provides additional
impetus for Congress to return to the issue of EISA preemption of
employee welfare benefit plans and, specifically, to permit certain tin
parachute provisions.
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